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When thinking about the notion of essence or of an essential feature, philoso-
phers typically focus on what I will call the notion of objectual essence. The
main aim of this paper is to argue that beside this familiar notion stands
another one, the notion of generic essence, which contrary to appearance
cannot be understood in terms of the familiar notion, and which also fails to
be correctly characterized by certain other accounts which naturally come to
mind as well. Some of my objections to these accounts are similar to some
of Kit Fine’s compelling objections to the standard modal account of (objec-
tual) essence (Fine 1994). In the light of these objections, Fine advances the
view that it is metaphysical necessity which has to be understood in terms of
essence, rather than the other way around, and takes essence to be unana-
lyzable. When formulating his view, Fine had only objectual essence in mind
(or had both concepts in mind, but assumed that the generic is a special case
of the objectual), and for that reason, I will argue, his account fails. I will
suggest that Fineans should modify their view, and take it that metaphysi-
cal necessity is to be understood in terms of the two notions of essence—a
view I myself find appealing. Finally, I will end by suggesting a further move
which reduces the objectual to the generic, making metaphysical necessity
reducible to generic essence alone—a move with which I myself have some
sympathy.
1. The Objectual and the Generic
The concept of essence is traditionally associated with questions of the form
‘What is a?’, where ‘a’ is a singular term like ‘Socrates’ or ‘the Moon’. The
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traditional view is that there is a distinctively metaphysical construal of ques-
tions of that form, and that describing the essence or some essential features
of a given object a is just giving an answer, be it complete or only partial,
to the metaphysical question as to what a is. Thus when Aristotlian-minded
philosophers claim that the essence of Socrates is to be a rational animal,
they intend to provide an answer to a question of the type under considera-
tion. And many readers of Kripke do the same when they claim that this or
that table could not have originated from a different piece of wood than the
one from which it actually had.
The concept of essence is also traditionally associated with questions of the
form ‘What is it to F?’, where ‘F ’ is a predicate expression like ‘be a human
being’, ‘be wise’, ‘think’, or ‘be related as father to son’. The traditional view
is that there is a distinctively metaphysical construal of these questions, and
that a complete or partial answer to the metaphysical question as to what it
is to F is a description of the essence or of some essential features of F-ing.
Thus many Aristotlian-minded philosophers who hold that the essence of
men consists in their being rational animals arguably intend their claim to
provide an answer to a question of the type under consideration. And many
readers of Kripke surely have a similar intention when they say that being
water is being H2O.
Let me sort the essentialist statements into the objectual and the generic.
An objectual statement is one which states that a given object is by its very
nature so and so, and a generic statement is one which states that to be thus
and thus is essentially to be so and so. An objectual statement is simply an
answer to an essentialist question of the first kind, and a generic statement
an answer to one of the second kind.
The objectual/generic distinction parallels the subject/predicate distinc-
tion, and as it were embodies that distinction in the realm of essence. For the
function of objectual statements is to describe the nature of what subjects
designate, namely things; and generic essentialist statements aim at describing
the essential features of what predicates express, namely ways of being.
Both concepts of essence, the objectual and the generic, occupy a central
place in philosophy. The metaphysician, for instance, is chiefly concerned with
the issue of determining the essence of things, as well as with the issue of
determining the essence of certain features. He wants to know what Socrates
is and what his life is; and he also wants to know what it is to be a substance
and what it is to be an event or a process.
But essentialist concerns are arguably not only those of a metaphysician.
For each particular domain of philosophy has its own generic essentialist
questions, its own questions as to what it is to be so and so. Examples abound:
What is it to exist? To be a number? A proposition? A person? What is it for
a proposition to be true? For an inference to be valid? For someone to be
rational? For something to have emotions? For an action to be good? For
something to be a crime?
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Given the importance of these two concepts of essence it is quite legitimate
to wonder how they are to be understood. Yet in the contemporary literature
on essence, focus has been on the objectual notion only, and the generic
notion has been neglected. This negligence may have several sources. One
might be the thought that the generic notion can be quite easily accounted
for, e.g., in terms of the objectual notion or in purely modal terms. I am sure,
for instance, that many would be happy with the view that generic essence is
nothing but objectual essence of “general entities’’, of properties for instance.
In what follows I will argue that this latter view, as well as other prima facie
plausible accounts of generic essence, have to be rejected.
2. The Formulation of Essentialist Statements
First, some preliminary points about the formulation of essentialist claims,
of both the objectual type and the generic type, are in order.
Objectual statements can have various grammatical forms.2 Most com-
monly, they have a subject-predicate form where the subject is a singular
term and the predicate is the result of applying the predicate modifier ‘essen-
tially’ to another predicate, yielding sentences of the form:
a essentially Fs.
Objectual statements can also have a form which is similar to the form of
standard propositional attitude reports like ‘Sam believes that number 7 is
prime’ or ‘John thinks that Mary is angry’, which result from applying the
binary operator ‘it is true in virtue of what is that . . .’ to a singular term
and a sentence, yielding sentences of the form:
It is true in virtue of what a is that p.
Both the predicational and the sentential mode of formulation have many
variants beyond the ones presented above. Thus, for instance, we have the
predicational forms ‘a by its very nature Fs’ and ‘it is part of a ’s nature that
it Fs’, and the sentential forms ‘it is true in virtue of the nature of a that p’
and ‘a is by its very nature such that p’.
Generic statements, like the objectual ones, can take several forms. There
are, for instance, the following quasi-predicational forms:
An F essentially Gs,
An F , as such, essentially Gs,
Fs essentially G, and
Fs, as such, essentially G,
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where ‘F ’ is a general term such that ‘is an F ’ is a monadic predicate and ‘G’
is a monadic predicate as well. There is indeed a construal of these forms ac-
cording to which they are synonymous and all express that G-ing is something
Fs do by virtue of what it is to be an F . Examples are ‘a man is essentially
an animal’, ‘samples of water essentially contain H2O molecules’, ‘a round
square, as such, is essentially square’ and ‘red things, as such, are essentially
colored’.
These forms can be used only to formulate statements about monadic
features. Statements about any kind of features, be they monadic or relational,
can be made by applying the somewhat artificial operator ‘being -related
(in a given order) essentially involves being . . . -related (in the same order)’
to pairs of predicate expressions of the same arity. The resulting statements
then have the cumbersome quasi-predicational form:
Being F-related (in a given order) essentially involves being G-related (in the
same order).
An example is ‘being related as father to son (in a given order) essentially
involves being related as genitor to progeniture (in the same order)’.
Besides the quasi-predicational forms stand sentential forms. For instance,
generic statements can be obtained by applying the binary operator ‘it is true
in virtue of what it is to that . . .’ to a predicate (in infinitive form) and a
sentence, yielding sentences of the form:
It is true in virtue of what it is to F that p.
Examples are: ‘it is true in virtue of what it is to be a man that men are
animals’, ‘it is true in virtue of what it is to be a set that the union of any
two sets is itself a set’, and ‘it is true in virtue of what it is to be related as
part to whole that any part of a part of something is a part of that thing’.
All essentialist statements we met so far are individual. Beside them stand
collective essentialist statements. An objectual statement is collective if it is a
statement to the effect that some fact holds by virtue of what several objects
taken together are, like, e.g., ‘in virtue of what number 3 and number 4 are,
it is true that 3 < 4’. Generic statements can also be collective, to wit ‘in
virtue of what it is to be a man and of what it is to be a number, it is
true that nothing can be both a man and a number’. And of course we can
build “hybrid’’ collective statements with both an objectual and a generic
character.
I take for granted that in the sphere of essentialist statements, whatever
can be formulated can be expressed in sentential form—be it individual or
collective. For instance, I shall take it that one can render ‘a is essentially F ’
by ‘it is true in virtue of what a is that a is F ’, and ‘an F essentially Gs’ by
‘it is true in virtue of what it is to be an F that Fs G’. I will consider the
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sentential mode of expression as providing the canonical way of formulating
essentialist claims, but I shall nevertheless feel free to use other modes of
formulation for stylistic reasons.
So much for the grammar of essence. In the next two sections I present
and reject some accounts of generic essence which may at first sight have
some plausibility.
3. Three Accounts of Generic Essence
I wish to present and reject here three accounts of generic essence, i.e., three
accounts of how generic statements are to be understood, which may appear
prima facie plausible. For the sake of simplicity, I shall focus on the restriction
of each account to generic statements about monadic features. Of course,
showing that the restricted accounts fail will be enough to show that the
corresponding full accounts have to be rejected. In order to fix ideas, we
shall take the target statements to be those of the predicational form:
(g) An F , as such, essentially Gs.
Focusing on statements in sentential form would make no difference.
Let me begin with the modal account. This is the adaptation to the generic
case of a standard approach to objectual essence. On this latter approach,
any statement of type ‘a essentially Fs’ should be understood as ‘necessarily,
if a exists, then a Fs’ (here as well as in the sequel, necessity is metaphysical
necessity). The modal account of generic essence is simply the view that (g)
should be understood as:
(g1) Necessarily, every F Gs.
I shall assume that (g) entails (g1). This I think is uncontroversial. The prob-
lem with the modal account is with the converse entailment.
In the important paper (Fine 1994), Fine argues against the standard
modal account of objectual essence. Some of his objections can straightfor-
wardly be adapted to argue against the modal account of generic statements.
Here are two such objections.
First, it is a general truth of predicate modal logic that necessarily, every
cat is either loved by Socrates or not. But we do not want to say, on that
account, that a cat, as such, is essentially either loved by Socrates or not:
being either loved by Socrates or not does not pertain to what it is to be a
cat—or so one can maintain.
The second objection runs as follows. It is a general truth of modal set
theory that necessarily, every object is a member of some set (its singleton-
set, for instance)—or so we may suppose. So necessarily, every cat belongs to
some set. But pace the friends of the modal account, it does not follow that
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cats, as such, essentially belong to sets: it is not part of the essence of cats
that they belong to sets—or at least, this surely can be maintained together
with the above mentioned general principle about sets.
One cannot reply to the previous objections simply by rejecting some of the
particular modal or essentialist claims involved therein. The first objection
does not rely on the view that it is false that cats, as such, are essentially either
loved by Socrates or not. The point is just that it can sensibly be maintained
that the proposition in question is false and at the same time accepted that
necessarily, every cat is either loved by Socrates or not. And similarly, the
second objection does not rely on the general principle of modal set theory
mentioned therein, nor on the view that it is false that cats, as such, essentially
belong to sets. Fine rightly stresses that “[. . .] any reasonable account of
essence should not be biased towards one metaphysical view rather than the
other. It should not settle, as a matter of definition, any issue which we are
inclined to regard as a matter of substance’’ (Fine 1994, p. 5). His claim
concerns objectual essence, and I wish to make the same point about generic
essence. It will be equally important to keep that point in mind throughout
the rest of the paper.
In order to escape the previous two objections, one may wish to modify
the proposed account by imposing the requirement that ‘G’ express a feature
which is not universally shared in all possible worlds, i.e., by claiming that
(g) should be understood as:
(g1∗) Necessarily, every F Gs, and possibly, something does not G.
But this will not do. For suppose as before that necessarily, everything belongs
to its singleton-set. Then as a matter of necessity, every cat belongs to some
set of cats. Since it is possible that there be things which do not belong to
sets of cats, by the proposed account cats, as such, belong to sets of cats.
Yet I maintain that this can be denied, even under the assumption that the
proposed principle of modal set theory holds.
Here is another problem for the view that (g) should be understood as
(g1∗). Presumably, the following general principle holds: if an F , as such, is
essentially both G and H, then an F , as such, is essentially G. Now suppose
that ‘an F , as such, is essentially G’ is true for some given predicate expressions
‘F ’ and ‘G’. By the proposed account, this means that (i) necessarily, every
F Gs, and (ii) possibly, something does not G. Now let ‘H’ express a feature
which is universally shared in all possible worlds. By modal reasoning, from
(i) it follows that (iii) necessarily, every F both Gs and Hs, and from (ii)
it follows that (iv) possibly, something does not both G and H. So by this
account, ‘an F , as such, is essentially both G and H’ is true. By the previous
general principle, it follows that ‘an F , as such, is essentially H’ is true. But
on the proposed account, this implies that ‘H’ expresses a feature which is
not universally shared in all possible worlds. Contradiction.
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Another account of generic essence one may find prima facie plausible is
framed in terms of necessity and objectual essence. It has it that (g) should
be understood as:
(g2) Necessarily, every F essentially Gs.
This account arguably escapes the difficulties encountered by the modal ac-
count. One may perfectly agree that as a matter of necessity, every cat is
either loved by Socrates or not, and belongs to some sets, and still deny that
my cat Nessie is by its very nature loved by Socrates or not, or a member
of some set. Actually, denying that Nessie has these features is denying the
implausible—or so it seems to me.
Yet this account must also be rejected, for it is not permissive enough: (g)
does not entail (g2). Plausibly, bachelors, as such, are essentially unmarried.
But many actual men are bachelors and fail to be essentially unmarried.3
At this point, one may be tempted to invoke “qua objects’’. The suggestion
is to understand (g) as:
(g3) Necessarily, for every x such that x is an F , x-qua-F essentially Gs.
Of course, the viability of the account rests in the first place on which concep-
tion of qua-objects is countenanced.4 But at first sight the proposal is quite
promising, insofar as it seems to escape all the previous difficulties under
any sensible conception of qua-objects. Even though we agree that neces-
sarily, cats are either loved by Socrates or not, and belong to sets, we may
still maintain that Nessie-qua-cat is neither essentially loved by Socrates or
not, nor essentially a member of some set. The difficulty met by the second
account also seems to disappear. For suppose that bachelors, as such, are
essentially unmarried. By the qua-account, it does not follow that all bach-
elors are essentially unmarried, but only that every qua-bachelor object is
essentially unmarried. And this appears to be unproblematic.
Anyway, the new account has to be rejected along with the other ones.
Let us leave aside the fact that the account is committed to a rather exotic
ontology that many would find unacceptable. One problem has to do with im-
possible features—and it actually affects the previous accounts as well, more
precisely the view that (g1) or (g2) entails (g). There can be no round squares.
So by the qua-account, round squares, as such, are essentially however you
like. But it may sensibly be maintained that a round square, as such, is essen-
tially round but not essentially human. Another problem is that qua-objects
have undesirable essential features. For instance, it is presumably the case
that any qua-object is by its very nature a qua-object. By the qua-account,
we should then say that, e.g., men, as such, are essentially qua-objects. But
of course this is absurd. A third problem is that the account arguably turn
things upside down. By the proposed account, the fact that bachelors, as
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such, are essentially unmarried consists in, and so is explained by, the fact
that necessarily, for every bachelor x, x-qua-bachelor is essentially unmar-
ried. But intuitively, explanation goes the other way around: it is because
bachelorhood attaches to the feature of being unmarried by virtue of what
it is to be a bachelor that necessarily, qua-bachelor objects, if there are such
things, are essentially unmarried.
Properties to the Rescue?
In the light of the previous considerations, and perhaps even independently,
it may appear that a proper account of generic essence should be framed
in terms of properties. The idea is that each generic statement is about the
objectual nature of a property or of properties.
The idea behind the approach under consideration is quite natural. When
we say that, say, men as such are essentially animals, we do not really talk
about individual men, be they actual or merely possible. Rather, we talk
about the having of a certain feature, that of being a man, and we attempt to
state what having that feature essentially involves. The proposed approach to
generic essence takes this fact seriously, and goes one step further: it reifies
features, and construes generic essentialist statements as objectual essentialist
statements about reified features, i.e., about properties.5
It is my view that this account has to be rejected. In order to show it,
I shall, as before, confine my attention to the restriction of the account to
generic statements of the form (g), i.e., to the view that (g) is to be understood
as:
(g4) It is true in virtue of what the property of F-ing is that Fs G.
But before giving my objections, let me emphasize the virtues of the proposed
account.
It is clear that the new account is quite promising as far as the previous
difficulties are concerned. Let me run through each relevant point in turn.
(i) The problem with the modal account was, in a nutshell, that if it were
correct, each of the following entailments would hold:
• Necessarily, every cat is either loved by Socrates or not ⇒ a cat, as such, is
essentially either loved by Socrates or not;
• Necessarily, cats belong to sets ⇒ a cat, as such, essentially belongs to sets.
On the proposed account, arguably neither entailment holds. For instance,
it is very implausible to say that it is true in virtue of what cathood is that
cats belong to sets, even on the grounds that necessarily, cats belong to sets.
(ii) Against the second account of generic essence, I argued that (g) does
not entail (g2). There is no problem here. For instance, the view that it is
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true in virtue of what bachelorhood is that bachelors are unmarried does
not exclude the view that there are bachelors who fail to be essentially so.
(iii) I finally argued against the qua-account on three grounds. There was
first the problem with impossible features. The problem does not affect the
account under consideration. For granted that there can be no round square,
it remains possible to claim that it is true in virtue of what the property of
being a round square is that round squares are round, but not that round
squares are human. And this claim actually has some plausibility. The second
problem was linked to certain features of qua-objects, and we may leave it
aside given that the present account does not invoke qua-objects. Finally,
there was the problem of explanatory inadequacy. Suppose that men, as
such, are essentially animals. By the present account, this fact consists in,
and so is explained by, manhood being essentially such that men are animals.
Here there does not seem to be any problem of switching explanans and
explanandum. For once it is granted that there is such a thing as the property
of being a man, it appears quite plausible to say that explanation goes the
way the present account claims it does.
So far so good. Now for the objections. The proposed account faces some
difficulties which I have sorted under the labels COMMITMENT TO PROP-
ERTIES, AVAILABILITY and DEPENDENCY.
COMMITMENT TO PROPERTIES. One problem is that generic state-
ments do not appear to carry by themselves any ontological commitment to
properties. The combination of the view that men, as such, are animals and
of the view that there are no properties does not seem to be self-undermining.
Of course, some generic statements clearly do carry such ontological commit-
ments. For instance, any statement of type ‘it is true in virtue of what it is to be
identical to the property of being a cat that . . .’ carries a commitment to what-
ever is denoted by ‘the property of being a cat’. But, one is inclined to say,
such statements involve a commitment to properties because of their pecu-
liar contents, not in virtue of their being generic essentialist statements. So
friends of the property account have to say that despite appearances, generic
essentialist statements do carry commitments to properties. And this, I think,
is a view that should be resisted as far as possible.
The previous objection is not lethal. One may after all learn to live with the
view that generic statements carry an ontological commitment to properties,
especially if accepting that view allows one to formulate an account of generic
statements which is satisfactory in all other respects, i.e., an account whose
sole defect is that it goes against first appearances about what ontological
commitments such statements carry. But as we shall now see, the proposed
account faces other difficulties.
AVAILABILITY. Another, more radical problem, is that some predicates
cannot possibly express properties, while there are corresponding true generic
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statements. Consider for instance the predicate ‘is a non-self-exemplifying
property’. There cannot be such a thing as the property of being a non-
self-exemplifying property. For if the property in question existed, it would
be the case that it exemplifies itself iff it does not. Now arguably, a non-
self-exemplifying property, as such, is essentially many things: non-self-
exemplifying, a property, an abstract object, a non-self-exemplifying property,
etc.
In response to this argument, one might think of the following move. Say
that a generic statement of type (g) is analytic iff the corresponding sentence
‘every F Gs’ is true in virtue of what the predicate expression ‘F ’ means. All
the generic statements mentioned above are presumably analytic. Now one
may think that the property account is not threatened by the problem of
“paradoxical properties’’ when restricted to generic statements which are not
analytic, and one may then hope that it is possible to formulate a general ac-
count of generic statements combining the property account for non-analytic
statements and some account of analytic statements.
But the view that the property account escapes the problem of para-
doxical properties when restricted to non-analytic statements is arguably
incorrect. Let us define the following predicates:
• An object is an L iff it is human if it exemplifies itself;
• An object is an M iff it has genetic make-up X if it exemplifies itself (‘X’ is
supposed to be a description of the human genetic make-up).
Assuming that humans, as such, have genetic make-up X, it is plausible
to conclude that an L, as such, is an M. Now on one hand, it is clear that
this conclusion is not analytic. And on the other hand, there can be no such
thing as the property of being an L.
The previous problems concern the view that (g) entails (g4). The following
one concerns the view that, conversely, (g4) entails (g).
DEPENDENCY. Consider the following thesis:
(M) It is true in virtue of what the property of being a man is that every man
exemplifies it.
It seems that the following general transitivity principle is correct:
(T) If a is essentially an F , and if an F , as such, essentially Gs, then a essentially
Gs.
If we accept that (g4) entails (g), from (M) and (T) we get the conclusion
that:
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(C) If a is essentially a man, then a essentially exemplifies the property of being
a man.
But consider Socrates. He is essentially a man—or so we may suppose. By
(C), it is part of the nature of Socrates that he bears a certain relation,
namely exemplification, to a given entity, to wit the property of being a
man. It then follows that Socrates is ontologically dependent upon the prop-
erty, that Socrates’ identity depends upon the property’s identity. But surely
even under the assumption that both (M) and (T) are true, this may be de-
nied: it is possible to maintain that Socrates is ontologically independent
from the property of being a man, and more generally from any property
whatsoever.6
In response to the problem of DEPENDENCY, it is perhaps tempting
to modify the account as follows. Where π is a property, let us say that an
expression is π -clean iff it contains no term designating π , and let us say that
a generic statement ‘an F , as such, essentially Gs’ is clean iff ‘G’ is π-clean,
where π is the property of being an F . The modified account says (i) that all
unclean instances of (g) are false, and (ii) that for a clean statement of type
(g) to be true is for the corresponding statement of type (g4) to be true.
But this will not do. First, the account is too restrictive. One may well
maintain that men, as such, exemplify the property of being a man. Such a
view should not be ruled out by a general account of generic statements. On
the other hand, the account is in another respect too permissive. For consider
the thesis:
(M∗) It is true in virtue of what the property of being a rational animal is that
every rational animal exemplifies rationality.
Now on the proposed account of generic statements, (M∗) and the transitivity
principle (T) mentioned above together lead to the view that Socrates is
ontologically dependent upon the property of being rational if he is essentially
a rational animal. But once again, one may accept both (M∗) and (T), and
at the same time think that Socrates is essentially a rational animal but not
essentially related to any property whatsoever.
5. Generic Essence, Objectual Essence and Metaphysical Necessity
So my view is that the four accounts of generic essence presented above fail. It
is hard for me to see which other account could be proposed, and throughout
the rest of this paper I will leave the issue aside. I am tempted to regard the
notion as unanalyzable, but nothing in what follows will hinge on whether
or not it is.
As I previously stressed, in (Fine 1994) Fine rejects the standard, modal
account of essence, claims that the notion should be taken as primitive, and
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holds that instead of “viewing essence as a special case of metaphysical ne-
cessity, we should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence”
(p. 9). The idea is that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for
it to be true in virtue of what a given object is, or in virtue of what some
given objects are. (Notice the use of the concept of collective essence here.)
The concept of essence Fine has in mind is that of objectual essence.
Fine takes metaphysical necessity to be true in virtue of the nature of some
objects, and so he endorses the following equivalence: it is metaphysically
necessary that p iff some objects are such that it is true in virtue of their
natures that p. I take it that the right-to-left part of that equivalence holds:
essential truths are necessary truths. What about the other direction?
We want generic truths to be metaphysically necessary. If it is true in
virtue of what it is to F that p, then it is metaphysically necessary that p—
and similarly for the collective case. Now take the proposition that whatever
is made of water is made of H2O molecules. On one view, the proposition is
true in virtue of what it is to be made of water, and so it should be necessarily
true. On Fine’s account, there should be a collection of objects in virtue of
whose natures the proposition is true. But which objects?
One natural suggestion is: the property of being made of water. Another
suggestion is: the property of being made of water and the property of being
made of H2O molecules. One might then be tempted to go on and maintain
that for each generic truth, there are properties whose natures (perhaps to-
gether with the natures of other objects) ensure its truth. But as we saw when
examining the account of generic essence in terms of properties, such a view
cannot be sustained. And on the other hand, it is hard to see how, in Fine’s
setting, one could do without invoking properties in such a way.
So we want both objectual essentialist truths and generic essentialist truths
to be metaphysically necessary, and Fine’s account of metaphysical necessity
is unable to satisfy the second desideratum. One way out which suggests itself
is to reduce metaphysical necessity to objectual essence and generic essence,
leaving the latter two notions as primitive. On that view, for a proposition
to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be an essentialist truth, objectual
or generic. Or perhaps a better proposal would be that for a proposition to
be necessary is for it to be an essentialist truth, be it objectual, generic or
“hybrid’’ (i.e., with both an objectual and a generic aspect). This latter view—
call it the GO-view (‘G’ is for ‘generic’ and ‘O’ for ‘objectual’)—appears to me
quite appealing, and anyway I suggest that Fineans should abandon Fine’s
original reductive claim and go for the GO-view.
Some might wish to supplement the GO-view with a thesis which has the
effect of simplifying the account of metaphysical necessity—a thesis I myself
find appealing. The thesis is that to be true in virtue of what some given
objects are is to be true in virtue of “what it is to be these objects’’. Let me
be more precise. To each singular term ‘a’ we may associate the haecceity-
predicate ‘is a’—’Ia’, in symbols. Let us use:
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• ‘ ’ for the necessity operator,
• ‘ a , b ,...’ for the objectualist operator ‘it is true in virtue of what a is, what b
is, . . . that’ (collectively understood),
• ‘ F , G ,...’ for the generic operator ‘it is true in virtue of what it is to F , what
it is to G, . . . that’ (collectively understood),
• ‘ a , b , ... | F , G ,...’ for the hybrid operator ‘it is true in virtue of what a is, what b
is, . . . and of what it is to F , what it is to G, . . . that’ (collectively understood).
(Both the objectual operator and the generic operator are definable in
terms of the hybrid operator, but the latter is not definable in terms of the
other two.) The thesis is that:
•  a, b ,... p iff  Ia , Ib ,... p
It is true in virtue of what a is, what b is, . . . that p iff it is true in virtue of
what it is to be a, what it is to be b, . . . that p.
The GO-view can be formulated as follows:
• p iff (∃x∃y. . .  x , y ,... p) or (∃ϕ∃ψ. . .  ϕ,ψ,... p) or (∃x∃y. . . ∃ϕ∃ψ. . .  x ,
y ,...|ϕ,ψ,... p)
It is metaphysically necessary that p iff
- there are some objects x, y, . . . such that it is true in virtue of what x is,
what y is, . . . that p, or
- there are some features ϕ, ψ , . . . such that it is true in virtue of what it is
to ϕ, what it is to ψ , . . . that p, or
- there are some objects x, y, . . . and there are some features ϕ, ψ , . . . such
that it is true in virtue of what x is, what y is, . . . and of what it is to ϕ,
what it is to ψ , . . . that p.
Accepting the previous thesis, one gets the simplified formulation of the
GO-view:
• p iff ∃ϕ∃ψ. . .  ϕ,ψ,... p
It is metaphysically necessary that p iff there are some features ϕ, ψ , . . . such
that it is true in virtue of what it is to ϕ, what it is to ψ , . . . that p.
On the resulting view, objectual essence reduces to generic essence, and meta-
physical necessity in turn reduces to generic essence.
Let me finish by briefly addressing a worry one may have about the GO-
view, whether in its original form or in its simplified version. Both formula-
tions of the view involve quantification into predicate position. The worry is
simply that because of this fact, the GO-view is ontologically committed to
properties (or other general entities), and forces one to accept the account of
generic essence in terms of properties which I previously rejected, or at least
meets a version of the problem of AVAILABILITY.
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I do not think there is any problem here. First, even assuming that the GO-
view is indeed committed to properties, I believe that the view does not force
one to endorse the property account of the generic, and I am not sure that
the view is threatened by some AVAILABILITY problem. Second, and more
importantly, I do no believe that the GO-view is committed to properties
or any other general objects. For a friend of the GO-view may take it, as
I do, that quantification into predicate position, unlike quantification into
nominal position, is not ontologically committing. See (Prior 1971, ch. II)
and (Rayo and Yablo 2001).
Notes
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at Arche’s Modality Workshop (St.
Andrews, UK, December 2003), Geneva’s Workshop on Abstract Objects (Geneva, Switzerland,
June 2004) and the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Kirchberg, Austria, August
2004). For their questions, objections and suggestions, I wish to thank David Chalmers, Kit
Fine, Jussi Haukioja, Alexander Kellenberger, Philipp Keller, Wolfgang Ku¨nne, Kevin Mulligan,
Josh Parsons, Jonathan Simon, Barry Smith, Crispin Wright, and other participants I may have
forgotten to mention. This work was carried out under the IRIS project on formal Concepts
(Lausanne-Geneva, dir. Kevin Mulligan) and the project Ontological Dependence (HUM2004–
05609-C02-01 (DGI), Barcelona, dir. Manuel Garcı´a Carpintero).
2 See (Fine 1995a) for a discussion.
3 Another account framed in terms of necessity and objectual essence has been suggested
to me: (g) should be understood as ‘necessarily, everything is essentially such that if it is an F ,
it Gs’. But I fail to see what could be said in its favor.
4 See (Fine 1982) for one such conception. Following (Lewis 2003) on qua-talk, (g3) can be
given the counterpart-theoretic translation ‘given any possible object x such that x is an F , all
counterparts of x which are Fs G’, which is equivalent to ‘every possible object which is an F
Gs’ (counterparthood is reflexive), which in Lewis’ framework is equivalent to (g1).
5 Some may wish to invoke kinds instead, or both kinds and properties. I focus on the
property approach, but what I will say can be straightforwardly modified to deal with the other
variants.
6 I understand ontological dependence as follows: x ontologically depends upon y iff x is
by its very nature related to y, i.e., iff there is a relation R such that it is part of the nature of
x that Rxy. Let us say that an object x necessitates a given object y iff x cannot exist unless
y does. Accepting (M) and (T) and denying the dependency of Socrates upon properties is
compatible with an Aristotelian view of properties according to which necessarily, a property
exists iff it has exemplifiers. On such a view, objects necessitate their essential properties, e.g.,
Socrates necessitates the property of being a man. The view would be incoherent if ontological
dependence was equivalent to necessitation, more precisely if necessitation entailed ontological
dependence. But there is no such entailment, or at any rate, this can sensibly be maintained. See
(Fine 1995b).
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